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October 15, 2015 by Nukewatch Leave a Comment

About $8.5 Trillion Unaccounted for in Military Budget 

Nukewatch Quarterly Fall 2015
By Global Research News

Yahoo Moneys’ The Daily Ticker quotes a Reuters investigation* that reveals that $8.5 trillion—that’s trillion with a “T,” give or take a few hundred million—in taxpayer money doled out by Congress to the Pentagon since 1996 has never been accounted for.

You read that right. While Republican politicians rush to slash food stamps for some 47 million Americans living in poverty—the highest amount in nearly 20 years—former US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel had the audacity to complain that $20 billion dollars in automatic sequester cuts to the $565.8 billion 2012 military budget are “too steep, too deep, and too abrupt,” all while the Pentagon is overseeing billions of dollars in fraud, waste, and abuse.

Above is roughly what the missing $8.5 trillion dollars would look like in $100 bills. Illustration from
DailyKos.com.
[For some context, the War Resisters League reports that the Pentagon’s fiscal 2016 budget of $586.8 billion—plus the $196 billion military portion from other departments—is more than the annual military budgets of the ten next largest military spenders combined, including Russia and China.]

In an interview, Linda Woodford, an employee at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)—the Pentagon’s main accounting agency—revealed to Reuters that she spent the last 15 years of her career simply “plugging in” false numbers every month to balance the books: “A lot of times there were issues of numbers being inaccurate. We didn’t have the detail … for a lot of it.”

In the real world, that would be called massive fraud.

Woodford’s involvement in the fraud doesn’t even begin to scratch the surface. The report also reveals that “a single DFAS office in Columbus, Ohio, made at least $1.59 trillion—yes, trillion—in errors, including $538 billion in plugs, in financial reports for the Air Force in 2009.”

“Yahoo Finance” lists additional findings, including: 

  • The Pentagon has amassed a backlog of more than $500 billion in unaudited contracts with outside vendors. How much of that money paid for actual goods and services delivered isn’t known.
  • Over the past ten years, the Pentagon has signed contracts for provisions of more than $3 trillion in goods and services. How much of that money is wasted in overpayments to contractors, or was never spent and never remitted to the Treasury, is a mystery.
  • The Pentagon uses a standard operating procedure to enter false numbers, or “plugs,” to cover lost or missing information in their accounting in order to submit a balanced budget to the Treasury. In 2012, the Pentagon reported $9.22 billion in these reconciling amounts. That was up from $7.41 billion the year before.

—Global Research News, Center for Research on Globalization, June 5, 2015

*Lauren Lyster, “Want to Cut Government Waste? Find the $8.5 Trillion the Pentagon Can’t Account For,” The Daily Ticker, Nov. 25, 2013; Scot J. Paltrow, “Faking It: Behind the Pentagon’s Doctored Ledgers, A Running Tally of Epic Waste,” Reuters, Nov. 18, 2013

Pentagon Accounting Fraud Balloons from 2001’s Missing to $2.3 Trillion

Today’s $8.5 trillion in lost military spending is 3.6 times the $2.3 trillion said to be unaccounted for in 2001 by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. In a speech given September 10 that year at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld said, “According to some estimates, we cannot track $2.3 trillion dollars in transactions.” According to the Congressional Record Nov. 8, 2005, Rumsfeld declared that the accounting mess was “monumental” and “terrifying,” and that it would take “a period of years to sort it all out.”

  • About $900 million in corporate welfare went to Navy ship building contractors. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a scathing review of newly built ships that together cost nearly $900 million more than originally estimated, according to a report released last March by Jacqueline Leo and Brianna Ehley of The Fiscal Times.
  • Nearly $1 billion was fraudulently billed by federal contractors doing routine maintenance work on Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) airplanes. “Workers” evidently faked time cards and overcharged the government hundreds of millions of dollars—and CBP officials didn’t notice any of it, Leo and Ehley reported.
  • Last October 22, Senator Tom Coburn, a Republican from Oklahoma, released his fifth annual “Wastebook” report tearing into outrageous government spending. Spotlighting items totaling $25 billion in “waste”—Ehley reported for The Fiscal Times—Coburn skewered the Pentagon’s $1 billion program to destroy $16 billion worth of unneeded ammunition. Evidently, according to a Government Accountability Office investigation, much of the expensive ammo became “obsolete, unusable or their use is banned by international treaty.” The GAO also found that the Pentagon’s record keeping for the ammo was so poor it couldn’t determine which ammo it could still use, and now has no choice but to destroy it.

About today’s vastly increased accounting and contractor fraud, a more recent Sec. of Defense, Chuck Hagel, has said the Pentagon’s inability to be audited “is unacceptable.” However, Hagel’s attempts to enforce “audit-readiness” deadlines repeatedly failed.

Rumsfeld’s Sept. 10, 2001 warning was lost in the next day’s 9/11 events, but in 2002, CBS News interviewed retired Vice Admiral Jack Shanahan, who commanded the Navy’s 2nd Fleet in 1976. In Adm. Shanahan’s opinion, “With good financial oversight we could find $48 billion in loose change in that building, without having to hit the taxpayers.” —JL

Filed Under: Military Spending, Newsletter Archives, Quarterly Newsletter

October 15, 2015 by Nukewatch Leave a Comment

Six-Nation Iran Deal: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Nukewatch Quarterly Fall 2015

On July 14, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Iran—the so-called P5+1—finalized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA, an anti-nuclear agreement to verifiably block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons and prevent any secret weapons development. US Senate Democrats have reportedly secured enough votes to effectively ratify the agreement when it reconvenes this fall.

Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball compiled answers to frequently asked questions about the JCPOA for the Arms Control Association. The following are excepted sections from their report:

Is Iran pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program? 

No. According to evidence collected by and shared with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran had an organized nuclear weapons program, but abandoned it in 2003….

In the 2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, also said that Iran would not be able to divert safeguarded nuclear material and enrich enough to weapons grade for a bomb without discovery.

Did the 2013 interim agreement, or Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), halt advances in Iran’s nuclear program? 

Yes. The implementation of the 2013 JPOA halted the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program and rolled back the most proliferation-sensitive elements.

Under the JPOA, Iran stopped enriching uranium to 20 percent, a key proliferation concern to the P5+1, because 20 percent enriched uranium is more easily enriched to weapons-grade material (greater than 90 percent U-235). Iran also took steps to neutralize its stockpile of 20 percent enriched-uranium gas.

Iran halted major construction activities on its Arak heavy-water reactor, froze the number of its operating and installed centrifuges, and agreed to more intrusive inspections, including daily access to its enrichment facilities. Iran also agreed to produce only the centrifuges necessary to replace damaged machines.

Without the JPOA, Iran could have very significantly increased its uranium-enrichment capacity and possibly completed the Arak reactor.

Did Iran comply with the terms of the 2013 JPOA, or did it violate it by operating an advanced centrifuge? 

The IAEA’s Nov. 7, 2014 quarterly report noted that Iran began feeding natural uranium hexafluoride “intermittently” into a single centrifuge at its pilot facility for the first time. While unhelpful, this was not a violation of the JPOA, which prohibits the use of advanced centrifuges to accumulate enriched uranium. However, to dispel any ambiguities, in the extension agreed to on Nov. 24, 2014, Iran agreed not to feed that centrifuge with any uranium for the duration of the interim agreement.

The IAEA has reported, and US Secretary of State John Kerry said on Nov. 24, 2014, that Iran upheld its commitments under the interim deal.

Did the UN Security Council resolutions require Iran to permanently halt enrichment, dismantle its enrichment facilities, and dismantle the heavy-water reactor at Arak? 

No. Since July 2006, the Security Council has passed six resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and suspend construction work on the heavy-water reactor at Arak. None of the six resolutions passed by the UN Security Council called for Iran to dismantle its enrichment facilities or permanently halt enrichment. The call for suspension was intended to push Iran to comply with the IAEA investigation into concerns about past activities possibly related to nuclear weapons development, and to promote a diplomatic resolution to the concerns over Iran’s nuclear program….

The Security Council resolutions were never intended to eliminate an Iranian civil nuclear program… that complies with the conditions of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty….

Why doesn’t the JCPOA require Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons capability? 

Eliminating that capability, including the knowledge, is, for all practical purposes, not possible. Even if Iran were required to completely “dismantle” its nuclear infrastructure, it could rebuild it. Tougher sanctions or a military strike also will not eliminate the knowledge and basic industrial capacity that Iran has developed and could rebuild.

Will the deal block all of Iran’s nuclear weapons pathways? 

Yes. This agreement will effectively block Iran’s uranium and plutonium pathways to the bomb for 15 years or longer. … [T]he agreement establishes verifiable limits on Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity and its stockpiles of enriched uranium. … [T]he time it would take Iran to produce enough highly enriched uranium for one bomb would increase to 12 months or more. It will also dramatically cut the output of plutonium at the Arak heavy-water reactor and eliminate Iran’s ability to pursue plutonium-based nuclear weapons.

The JCPOA will also put in place additional measures to ensure that any covert program is deterred or quickly detected. … The additional protocol also helps the IAEA check for any clandestine nuclear activities in Iran by providing the agency with greater authority to carry out timely inspections in any facility, civilian or military, that the IAEA has reason to believe is engaged in noncompliant activity….

Does the JCPOA provide the IAEA with “anytime, anywhere” access to suspected nuclear sites? 

The JCPOA provides timely access to any site, military or civilian…. The IAEA must identify specific questions to be resolved and identify specific locations where it wants to send its inspectors. … There are 121 countries that have an “additional protocol” in force and 78 complementary access visits were carried out last year [2014]. Only in Iran is there a process to ensure timely access.

[T]he request by the IAEA triggers a 24-day clock under which Iran and the IAEA have 14 days to come to an agreement on access. If not, the Joint Commission, created by the JCPOA, has seven days to make a determination on access, and if at least five of the eight members vote to allow the IAEA to investigate, Iran has three days to comply.

If Iran tries to stall access beyond 24 days, there are consequences. If just one of the P5+1 countries is not satisfied with the decision of the Joint Commission on access, it could take action to re-impose earlier UN Security Council sanctions on Iran….

If there is a delay, the IAEA will be closely watching a site once it becomes suspicious by ordering satellite imagery, perhaps continuing through the investigation, and by seeking corroborating information, especially from states willing to share intelligence information.

Could Iran cover up illicit activities at a suspect site within 24 days? 

… Critics of site access provisions charge that 24 days may provide Iran with enough time to cover up certain types of nuclear activities. … Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz told Politico.com on July 22 that Energy Department specialists assess that, “It is essentially impossible, certainly with confidence, to believe that you’re going to do this kind of work with nuclear materials and be confident at having it cleaned it up.”

How long does the sanctions’ snap-back provision last? 

For the ten-year duration of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, if a dispute is not addressed through the Joint Commission to the satisfaction of the P5+1, any one of the six-countries could act to snap back earlier UN Security Council sanctions on Iran. …

Filed Under: Newsletter Archives, Nuclear Weapons, Quarterly Newsletter

October 15, 2015 by Nukewatch Leave a Comment

Nukewatch Plans Truck Watch to Alert Public to Radioactive Transport Dangers 

Nukewatch Quarterly Fall 2015
This map shows likely radwaste transport routes if an “interim” high-level radioactive waste storage facility were built at the Waste Control Specialists site in western Texas. The routes would be similar if the waste site proposed by Holtec International, just across the state border in New Mexico, is approved. Graphic modified from the Nuclear Information and Resource Service.

This fall, Nukewatch staffers will hit the road with our Geiger counter and begin tracking private contractors hauling low-level waste, checking for radiation leaking near our public highways. Nukewatch will use the results of their research to alert the public and inform a campaign against upcoming consolidated waste storage proposals that would require a massive increase in the cross-country transport of decades’ worth of waste or “spent” reactor fuel rods.

We know private haulers are already trucking military and other low-level radioactive waste across the country; currently, it’s going to the only open storage facility in the US, the private waste dump operated by Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in western Texas. But it now seems likely that soon, the Department of Energy will begin moving the 75,000 metric tons, and counting, of spent reactor fuel—that continues to pile up at the country’s 99 operating reactors, at 61 sites spread across 30 states—to a centralized, “interim” storage facility.

This kind of radioactive transport would be on a scale we’ve never seen before—and so would the associated risks. We feel it is time to prepare for action. People need to know about the existing risks of radioactive transports so we can mobilize against a centralized waste storage plan that would move high-level spent fuel rods through our backyards as well. We need to get more information about the private contractors that are hauling radioactive cargo, where they’re traveling, how much radiation is leaking from them, and what else those same contaminated trucks are carrying—so we can alert the public.

The government has plenty of short-term financial incentive to permit a consolidated, high-level storage site for waste reactor fuel. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires the Department of Energy to provide long-term disposal of reactor waste from private utilities in a centralized facility that was supposed to be ready in 1998. In 2000, reactor operators began suing the federal government for damages associated with the costs of onsite storage of the waste fuel rods and other high-level waste—that the government promised to handle for them. By the end of the 2014 fiscal year, the government had already paid out some $4.5 billion in these waste storage settlements. Two private companies are now vying for the lucrative privilege of providing “interim” storage for all of this reactor waste, until a more “permanent” solution can be found.

A truck operated by private contractor Visionary Solutions, LLC (based in Oak Ridge, TN), prepares to haul radioactive waste over public highways from the Los Alamos National Laboratory weapons production site to the private Texas waste dump operated by Waste Control Specialists. Starting in 2012, contractors at Los Alamos packed up to 5,565 radioactive waste barrels with volatile, organic kitty litter and then shipped many of them (incorrectly labeled) on trucks like this one to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, for storage. So far, one of those barrels has exploded underground at WIPP, contaminating more than 20 workers and shuttering the facility in February of 2014. Luckily, none of the mispackaged barrels exploded while in transit.

One of these is WCS (in partnership with French nuclear giant AREVA), which plans to submit an application for an independent spent fuel storage installation license by April 2016, for its site in Andrews County, Texas; so far this site is only permitted to manage “low-level” waste disposal. The other waste site, proposed by Holtec International, is just across the border in New Mexico, where the multi-national has partnered with regional economic development moguls on an offer to store waste reactor fuel with “no technical limit on the facility’s storage capacity.” The opening of either facility would not only put these highly radioactive fuel rods on the roads; it would also give the nuclear energy industry a green light to keep rickety old reactors online and keep producing more and more deadly waste.

Nukewatch has a long history of alerting the public to the dangers of radioactive transports. In the 1980s we organized more than a dozen H-bomb Truck Watches with groups from more than 32 states. We taught people how to recognize the nuclear weapons transport trucks in their backyards. Dedicated Nukewatch volunteers followed weapons convoys for days on end, sometimes at high speed and through dangerous weather conditions. In 1987, we compiled reports from our staff and volunteers to publish a map of the weapons truck routes in the United States that helped activists mobilize local resistance to the nuclear bombs in their midst. We also reported on little-known accidents, like the November 16, 1996 crash in Nebraska, where a truck carrying two warheads went off the road around 1:00 a.m. during a blizzard.

We keep track of many issues related to nuclear weapons, power, and waste, and we feel strongly that now is the time for us to focus on alerting the public to the dangerous radioactive waste shipments traveling—sometimes unmarked—through our neighborhoods across the country. With decades of experience identifying, publicizing, and resisting radioactive transports, we are in a unique position to take on this increasingly urgent issue. We hope you will help us by supporting this important campaign, and we look forward to providing updates in our next newsletter. —Nukewatch Staff

Filed Under: Environment, Newsletter Archives, Quarterly Newsletter, Radiation Exposure, Radioactive Waste

July 15, 2015 by Nukewatch Leave a Comment

Wasting New Mexico: State Invites High-Level Reactor Waste as Energy Department Eyes Carlsbad’s Contaminated WIPP Site for Plutonium Disposal

Nukewatch Quarterly Summer 2015
By Arianne Peterson 

In an April 10 letter, New Mexico Governor Susana Martinez urged the US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz to move forward with plans to establish a “consolidated interim storage facility in southeastern New Mexico.” The proposed site would hold the nuclear power industry’s ever-growing legacy of reactor fuel rods and other high-level radioactive waste, which the government projects will reach 141,000 metric tons based on current reactor licenses. Since the rise of nuclear energy in the 1970s, the US government has promised to find a permanent, safe solution for disposing of its deadly by-products—but so far, the Energy Department has failed to find a viable option, and decades’ worth of discarded fuel rods have remained at reactor sites throughout the country.

New Mexico’s interim storage proposal would require transporting this dangerous reactor waste from more than 60 sites dispersed across the country to the state’s southeastern corner. The waste would remain at the site for 100 years, or ostensibly until a more permanent solution is found. The global energy company Holtec International and a private regional company called the Eddy Lea Energy Alliance have signed a Memorandum of Agreement to partner in the venture. The site they have identified is near Carlsbad, just 12 miles from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) radioactive waste repository. WIPP has been closed since February 2014 when an underground barrel explosion there contaminated 22 workers and caused an above-ground release of radioactive particles.

Holtec would be responsible for designing, licensing, building, and operating the new facility using a scaled-up version of its HI-STORM UMAX (for Holtec International Storage Module Underground Maximum Capacity) underground dry-cask storage design. This design has not yet been successfully implemented anywhere in the world; Holtec will hold an “inaugural loading campaign” later this summer at the Callaway nuclear power facility in Missouri, where its first HI-STORM UMAX casks will be filled with radioactive waste. Holtec claims “there is no technical limit on the [planned New Mexico] facility’s storage capacity,” implying that the dump would accommodate all current reactor waste—and encourage the industry to keep producing more.

More plutonium headed to WIPP? 

While Governor Martinez invites waste from the rest of the country’s nuclear power facilities for storage at Holtec’s proposed site (New Mexico doesn’t actually have any commercial reactors of its own), the federal government is considering the contaminated, shuttered WIPP facility just down the road as a final resting place for 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. On May 9, the Energy Department released a report identifying WIPP as a lower-cost alternative to the proposed mixed oxide (MOX) nuclear program, which was supposed to convert weapons plutonium into commercial reactor fuel. Taxpayers have already spent $4.4 billion on construction of the MOX facility at Savannah River in South Carolina; a division of the French nuclear giant Areva has benefitted from the design contract. Watchdog groups have long derided the project— which is over-budget and behind schedule, suffering from poor management and a lack of oversight.

The May Energy Department report projected the final cost of the MOX program to be at least $47.5 billion, a price government officials admit the country cannot afford. Sending the plutonium to WIPP would be far less expensive—and so far, it’s the only other option they’ve studied. Of course, the WIPP plan would first require that the shuttered site be reopened; it would also necessitate an amendment to the Land Withdrawal Act, which governs WIPP’s operations, to allow for more plutonium disposal. An Energy Department report on further plutonium disposal options is due out in September.

Meanwhile, WIPP remains closed, with clean-up expected to require several years and $550 million. In April, the ad hoc Accident Investigation Board appointed by the Energy Department issued its final report on the barrel explosion, which it termed “preventable.” The report blames the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), where contractors packed the volatile drum, and the Energy Department itself for mismanagement and negligence, including failure to listen to worker concerns—such as reports of foam and neon smoke emanating from drums. The Board’s investigation confirmed that a highly combustible combination of nitrate salts and organic cat litter in the improperly packed, improperly labeled barrel was the direct cause of the explosion.

State settles with Energy Department over violations 

Because of the WIPP disaster, the Energy Department reduced the bonuses (monetary incentives above and beyond operating costs) for its contracted operators at WIPP and LANL in 2014. The New Mexico Environment Department threatened to levy more than $150 million in fines against the federal government for permit violations and other failures that caused the contamination, but the state recently accepted a settlement of just $73 million in federal dollars earmarked for highway improvements and other infrastructure projects around the WIPP and LANL.

Greg Mello of the watchdog Los Alamos Study Group expressed concern that the settlement does not actually address the problems that led to the leak. “I’m a little flabbergasted … that the state would negotiate what the money is used for. … What does that have to do with [the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] violations? It seems like an entirely different sphere.” Mello argues that the projects, which are directly related to maintenance and operations of the federal Energy Department facilities, should be part of a regular budget rather than the result of a settlement for environmental permit violations. New Mexico’s Environment Department Secretary Ryan Flynn reported that lobby groups for local contractors, who will benefit from the projects, “heavily influenced the settlement.”

New Mexico’s radioactive burden 

Radioactive contamination is not a new problem for New Mexico. In addition to the Los Alamos facility, the state is also home to the Sandia National Laboratories; both labs were established in the 1940s to develop the first atomic bombs and are still active in nuclear weapons research. The White Sands Missile Range, including the site of the first nuclear bomb test, occupies over 3,000 square miles in the southern part of the state. Uranium mining has left a terrible radioactive legacy on the western New Mexico portion of the Navajo Nation, with 450 abandoned mines and eight former mills—three of which are designated Superfund sites—contaminating countless acres and tens of millions of gallons of groundwater.

On the east side of the state, Urenco USA opened a uranium enrichment facility in 2010. Just yards away from the Urenco facility, on the Texas side of the border, Waste Control Specialists (WCS) operates the nation’s only private low-level radioactive waste dump. In a February bid that could put it in competition with Holtec and WIPP, WCS announced plans to apply for a permit to store high-level waste, including reactor fuel rods and plutonium-contaminated military waste. No matter which company or government contractor ends up profiting from the nation’s nuclear legacy, odds seem good that New Mexico will bear the brunt of the country’s nuclear waste burden.

—Aiken Standard, May 20; Santa Fe New Mexican, May 1; Holtec Highlights, Apr. 30 & May 4; Albuquerque Journal, Apr. 17; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan. 18, 2015; Truthout, Feb. 20, 2014

Filed Under: Newsletter Archives, Nuclear Power, Quarterly Newsletter, Radioactive Waste

July 15, 2015 by Nukewatch Leave a Comment

Nuclear Resisters Released, Sabotage Convictions Overturned —Appeals Court Says Jury Verdict Was “Not Rational”

Nukewatch Quarterly Summer 2015
By John LaForge 

A federal appeals court has vacated the sabotage convictions of peace activists Greg Boertje-Obed of Duluth, Minnesota; Michael Walli of Washington, DC; and Sister Megan Rice of New York City. On May 8, a three-judge panel of the Sixth US Circuit Court of Appeals found that federal prosecutors had failed to prove—and “no rational jury could find”—that the protesters had intended to damage “national defense.”

In July 2012, Greg, Michael, and Megan clipped through four fences and walked right up to the “Fort Knox” of weapons-grade uranium, the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility inside the Y-12 complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In the hour before they were confronted, the nuclear abolitionists painted “Woe to an Empire of Blood” and other slogans on several structures, strung banners, poured blood on the building, and enjoyed their surprise in catching the nuclear weapons system asleep at the wheel. When a guard finally approached them, they offered him some bread.

The three have been imprisoned since they were convicted in May 2013 of damage to property and sabotage. Boertje-Obed, 60, and Walli, 66, were both sentenced to 62 months on each conviction, to run concurrently; Sister Rice, now 85, was given 35 months on each count, also running concurrently.

Following the appeals court reversal, a motion for immediate release was filed and granted—unopposed by the government—on May 15. All three activists were hastily allowed to return to their respective homes.

The appeal did not address questions about the legal status of nuclear weapons, but rather focused on whether the Sabotage Act applies to nonviolent protesters. During the appeal’s oral argument, the prosecutor insisted that the three senior citizens had “interfered with defense.” Circuit Judge Raymond Kethledge asked pointedly, “With a loaf of bread?”

The court’s written opinion, also by Judge Kethledge, ridiculed the idea of depicting peaceful protesters as saboteurs, saying. “It is not enough for the government to speak in terms of cut fences…” To apply the Sabotage Act, the government must prove that the defendant’s actions were “consciously meant or practically certain to” interfere with “the nation’s capacity to wage war or defend against attack.” The court found that Greg, Megan, and Michael “did nothing of the sort”; thus, “the government did not prove the defendants guilty of sabotage.” The opinion went so far as to say, “No rational jury could find that the defendants had that intent when they cut the fences.” The opinion is uncharacteristically blunt in its direct implication of prosecutorial overreach and judicial manipulation of the jury.

Another reason the appeals court vacated the sabotage conviction was that the Supreme Court’s legal definition of “national defense” is unclear and imprecise, “a generic concept of broad connotations…” The appeals court said it needed “a more concrete” definition because “vague platitudes about a facility’s ‘crucial role in national defense’ are not enough to convict a defendant of sabotage. And that is all the government offers here.” The definition is so general and vague, the court said, that it barely applies to the Sabotage Act, since, “It is hard to determine what amounts to ‘interference with’ a ‘generic concept.’”

Re-sentencing may result in “time served” 

The appeals court took the unusual additional step of voiding the prison sentences for both the sabotage and damage-to-property convictions, even though the second conviction still stands. This was because the harsh prison terms given for property damage were heavily weighted in view of the (ill-gotten) sabotage conviction. The result is that the three radical pacifists were released until their re-sentencing, which is scheduled for July 8. As the appeals court said: “It appears that the [sentencing] … for their [damage to property] conviction will be substantially less than their time already served in federal custody.”

The high-profile nature of uranium enrichment at Oak Ridge, and the vulnerability of the site to the entrance of three senior citizens, brought enormous media attention to the case, which has been featured in lengthy investigations by the Washington Post, the New Yorker, and others. The action, known as “Transform Now Plowshares,” also helped uncover scandalous misconduct and malfeasance among security contractors at the Y-12/Oak Ridge complex.

What remains unaddressed is the White House’s plan to spend $1 trillion on new weapons production facilities over the next 30 years—$35 billion a year for three decades. The role of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility in nuclear bomb production—a clear violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—was named with blood by the Transform Now Plowshares action, but H-bomb business marches on. Protesters will converge on the site again August 6, the 70th anniversary of the US atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

For more on Y-12 and the weapons build-up, see the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance, OREPA.org.

Ill-Informed Distinction in Appeals Court Order 

The appeals court opinion made one apparently ill-informed distinction between this case and two other Plowshares actions. In symbolic protest actions taken on top of Minuteman nuclear missile silos, the Silo Pruning Hooks (Carl Kabat, Helen Woodson, Paul Kabat, and Larry Cloud Morgan) hammered on silo N-5 in Missouri in 1985, and the Sacred Earth and Space Plowshares (Sisters Ardeth Platte, Carol Gilbert, and Jackie Husdon) did symbolic damage to silo N-8 in Colorado in 2002.

The appeals court opinion declares that unlike actions taken at weapons manufacturing sites, protests against sites with armed nuclear weapons on alert could still be characterized as sabotage because, “… even a brief disruption of [the Minuteman III’s] operations would have grievously impaired the nation’s ability to attack and defend. (Imagine, for example, if Soviet [sic] infiltrators had similarly disrupted the facilities’ operations in the minutes before a Soviet first strike.)”

This claim betrays profound ignorance of the US nuclear arsenal’s diversity, size, and destructive capacity—and of geopolitical events including the long-past dissolution of the Soviet Union.

A computer glitch at Wyoming’s FE Warren Air Force Base in 2010 took 50 Minuteman missiles off-line but had, according to Lt. Gen. Dirk Jameson (USAF, Ret.), “no real bearing on the capabilities of our nuclear forces.” Gen. Jameson was a Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of Strategic Command, which controls all 450 Minuteman III land-based ICBMs. Lt. Col. John Thomas, a spokesman for the Air Force’s Global Strike Command, said at the time, “The wartime capability of that squadron [of missiles] was never significantly affected.”

Additionally, the US has 14 Trident ballistic missile submarines, each armed with 24 missiles that carry at least five warheads apiece. If only four of these submarines are on patrol at any given time, their 480 thermonuclear warheads could incinerate all the major cities of the world, not merely those in “Soviet” [sic] territory.

The court also appeared ignorant of the fact that the Air Force regularly takes dozens of Minuteman III missiles off alert for repairs or replacement, meaning they are often “disrupted” without any consequent impairment of the government’s nuclear war readiness.

The appeals court cited testimony of an Air Force Lt. Col. who said, regarding missile protests, that “it would be unwise to launch the missile in those circumstances.”

Of course, thousands of authorities the world over have said it would be unwise to launch such missiles under any circumstances. Former Reagan Administration Presidential Adviser and Cold War hawk Paul Nitze said, “I can think of no circumstances under which it would be wise for the United States to use nuclear weapons, even in retaliation for their prior use against us.”

Filed Under: Direct Action, Newsletter Archives, Quarterly Newsletter, Uranium Mining

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