By Lydia Petersen
CAPE TOWN, South Africa ⸺ In July 2024, Eskom Corp. brought Unit 2 of the Koeberg nuclear reactor station ⸺ a cornerstone of South Africa’s nuclear so-called Long-Term Operation (LTO) strategy ⸺ back online after significant delays. Framed as a “fix for energy insecurity and climate change,” the project is mired in cost overruns, missed deadlines, and legal wrangling. In July 2025, Eskom, owner and operator of the Koeberg reactors, was court-ordered to pay 1-billion South African rands (approximately $56.4 million) over disputes tied to a delayed steam generator replacement. The court’s decision exposes the risks and contradictions of extending aging nuclear infrastructure, not only for South Africa, but for the world, and is a global caution against nuclear “solutions” to the climate crisis.
A crumbling timeline
The repeated delays in the restart of Unit 2 disrupted Eskom’s energy planning and deepened the country’s electricity crisis during which South Africa has been experiencing rolling black-outs. While Koeberg Unit 1 received a 20-year operating license extension, the decision on Unit 2’s extension was deferred. The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) has since opened a public comment period on the proposed extension, even as the unit resumes operations. With Unit 1 now offline for a planned outage, Koeberg will not run at full capacity again until late 2025. This fragmented process raises serious questions about how nuclear LTOs are being justified in the context of South Africa’s ongoing energy instability.
The $56-million fallout
Recently, the Western Cape High Court ordered Eskom to pay $56 million to France’s nuclear giant Framatome, which oversaw Koeberg’s steam generator replacement. Eskom had resisted resolving the matter through adjudication, opting instead for litigation, and insisted the payment was a “contractual obligation” rather than a penalty. Regardless of semantics, public funds are once again being used to resolve disputes tied to questionable project governance. The full financial cost of Koeberg’s LTO remains secretive, a recurring theme in nuclear contracting worldwide.
Unfinished safety business
Despite Unit 1’s license extension, critical safety concerns remain unresolved. The NNR imposed 29 safety conditions for continued operation, including issues related to containment integrity, corrosion, and seismic preparedness. Eskom claims it is addressing these, but civil society groups have flagged inconsistencies and a lack of transparency in compliance reporting. Adding to the concern is a broader governance issue: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has warned that South Africa’s Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, an active promoter of nuclear power, should not serve as the oversight body for the NNR. This conflict of interest undermines regulatory independence and erodes public trust.
Disposal Institute
Waste transport ⸺ a hidden risk
One of the least discussed but most consequential aspects of Koeberg’s LTO is the increase in radioactive waste shipments to the Vaalputs National Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility in the Northern Cape. Waste is transported 375 miles by road inmetal or concrete containers, following IAEA transport regulations. However, the reality on the ground tells a different story.
The primary route to Vaalputs is the R355, a remote, poorly maintained road that has long been flagged by community members and civil society as a safety hazard. Years of appeals to government departments and portfolio committees have yielded no meaningful upgrades. With Koeberg’s LTO expected to generate waste for another two decades, and a proposed Centralized Interim Storage Facility (CISF) at Vaalputs, the volume and frequency of waste transports will increase significantly.
This raises serious questions about South Africa’s ability to meet international benchmarks, not just in packaging and radiation shielding, but in infrastructure resilience, emergency preparedness, and community protection. The IAEA’s standards emphasize not only container integrity but also route safety, public consultation, and risk mitigation. South Africa’s current transport framework falls short on all three.
A global cautionary tale
Koeberg’s LTO is not an isolated case. Across the U.S., Europe, and Asia, utilities are attempting to extend the lives of aging reactors under similar conditions: deferred maintenance, ballooning costs, and weakened oversight. These efforts are often framed as climate solutions, yet the lived realities — from legal disputes to unresolved safety risks — tell a different story. South Africa’s experience with Koeberg adds to mounting global evidence that nuclear power, particularly operating extensions for aging plants, cannot form the backbone of a just and democratic energy transition.
As South Africa pushes ahead with its nuclear agenda, civil society continues to demand transparency, accountability, and a genuine shift toward community-owned renewable energy, not false solutions cloaked in the language of climate urgency. The road to Vaalputs is more than a transport route; it’s a symbol of systemic neglect, regulatory failure, and the urgent need for a new energy paradigm.
— Lydia Petersen is an environmentalist and anti-nuclear activist from Capetown, South Africa. She is the spokesperson for Koeberg Alert Alliance.
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